State of Utah, Road Commission v. W. Roy Brown, Evelyn J. Brown, Valley Bank & Trust Company; Zions Bank & Trust; Southland Corporation : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
State of Utah, Road Commission v. W. Roy Brown,
Evelyn J. Brown, Valley Bank & Trust Company;
Zions Bank & Trust; Southland Corporation : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bert L. Dart; Jerman and Dart; Attorney for Defendant Southland Corp.; W. Eugene Hanson;
Attorney for Defendants Brown.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; John S. McAllister; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State of Utah, Road Commission v. W. Roy Brown, Evelyn J. Brown, Valley Bank & Trust Company; Zions Bank &
Trust; Southland Corporation, No. 13742.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/916
IN THE 
SUPREMEJCOURTA^EE 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH DEC
 5 1975 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
W. ROY BROWN and EVELYN J. 
BROWN, his wife; VALLEY BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY; ZIONS 
BANK & TRUST; SOUTHLAND 
CORPORATION (7-11 Stores), 
Defendants and Respondents. 
t* AM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, 
leuben Clark Law School 
Case No. 
13742 
B R I E F OF RESPONDENTS 
W. ROY BROWN and EVELYN J. BROWN 
Appeal from the judgment on the verdict in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, presiding. 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
JOHN s. MCALLISTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appel 
Ralph L. Jerman 
B. L. Dart, Jr. 
JERMAN & DART 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
The Southland Corporation 
W. EUGENE HANSEN 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents Brown 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
f I L t 
OCT 2 41974 
430 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ch4, SufK*<™» Court, Utah 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH PHONE 487.0651 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 4 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE INSTRUC-
TIONS GIVEN BY IT WERE PROPER AND 
DID NOT RESULT IN AN AWARD TO DE-
FENDANT LANDOWNERS BROWN WHICH 
EXCEEDED JUST COMPENSATION 4 
POINT II. THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DE-
NYING THE ROAD COMMISSION'S MO-
TION TO STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF 
THE DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS .. 12 
POINT II. THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AT TRIAL 15 
CONCLUSION 18 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated §78-34-10 (1953) 5 
Colorado Revised Statutes §50-1-6(3) (Perm. Supp. 
1967) 6 
Consolidated Laws of New York, Volume 9A Con-
demnation Law §22 (1950) 7 
CASES CITED 
City of Ogden v. Stephens, 21 U. 2d 336, 445 P. 2d 
703 (1968) 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 
Page 
City of Sterling v. Plains Investment Co., 511 P. 2d 
512 (Colo. 1973) 6 
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. State, 
238 N. E. 2d 705 (N. Y. a . App. 1968) 6 
State through Road Commission v. Dillree, 25 U. 2d 
184, 478 P. 2d 507 (1970) 17 
Vivian v. Board of Trustees of Colo. School of Mines, 
383 P. 2d 801 (Colo. 1963) 6 
Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Co., 9 U. 2d 275, 
342 P. 2d 1094 (1959) 13 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
7 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Revised Third Edi-
tion (1973) §11.02, p. 11-5 8 
29A Corpus Juris Secundum "Eminent Domain" §198 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
S T A T E OF U T A H , by and through 
its R O A D COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
W. ROY BROWN and E V E L Y N J. 
BROWN, his wife; V A L L E Y B A N K 
& T R U S T COMPANY; ZIONS 
BANK & T R U S T ; S O U T H L A N D 
CORPORATION (7-11 Stores), 
Defendants and Respondents. 
B R I E F OF R E S P O N D E N T S 
W. ROY BROWN and E V E L Y N J . BROWN 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This is a condemnation action by the Utah State 
Road Commission to acquire certain real property be-
longing to W. Roy Brown and Evelyn J . Brown and 
leased by Southland Corporation (7-11 Stores) located 
on 5300 South at approximately 500 West, Salt Lake 
County, for the purpose of constructing an expressway 
thereon. 
I Case No. 
13742 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The case was tried before a jury, the Honorable 
Joseph G. Jeppson presiding. The jury returned a 
verdict of $62,840.76 in favor of the land owners, Re-
spondents herein, and $15,767.00 in favor of the lessee 
of the premises. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents W. Roy Brown and Eve-
lyn J . Brown, his wife, seek affirmation on the trial 
court verdict. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Since the state has omitted certain relevant facts 
from its statement, the following is submitted by way 
of background and clarification. Respondents Brown 
purchased the property which is the subject of the 
state's condemnation in 1964 after Brown had entered 
into a long term lease with the Southland Corporation 
(hereinafter sometimes called 7-11). (T. 148). Brown 
improved the property substantially and then construct-
ed a building specifically in accordance with the speci-
fications of 7-11. The building was the distinctive de-
sign of 7-11 stores: brick construction, terrazzo floors 
and the entry and exit being across the front of the 
store. (T. 149). Prior to the take by the state the access 
(over two hundred & fifty feet along 5300 South) to 
the property was unlimited. After the take the access 
was reduced to one 30 foot driveway on the east and one 
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50 foot joint driveway on the west. The front parking 
area was substantially reduced and there was a signifi-
cant change in grade with the roadway being higher than 
the level of the blacktop in front of the 7-11 store. All 
of these factors made it impossible for 7-11 to carry on 
the operation of their store and they cancelled their 
lease. 
At the time of the take by the state, Brown's lease 
with Couthland Corporation had 11 years and 2 months 
to run on the primary term and also contained a provi-
sion for two-5 year options. From the time 7-11 vacated 
the premises up to trial the Respondents Brown had 
only been able to rent the property for 2% months for a 
rent of $100.00 per month. (T. 149). 
Brown testified to a damage figure of $120,000.00 
(T. 154). He also testified that his property was more 
valuable because of the lease with the Southland Cor-
poration. 
Mr. Charles Saxton (a former appraiser for the 
state) the expert witness for Respondents Brown, testi-
fied to a damage figure of $110,900.00 as a result of the 
state's take. Saxton testified that in his opinion the 
Brown's property was worth more because of the 7-11 
lease than it would be without the lease. 
The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $78,-
607.76 to cover both the damage to the landowner and 
the lessee 7-11. The jury also apportioned the damage 
at $62,840.76 for the landowner and $15,767.00 for the 
lessee. In addition, the jury awarded damages to 7-11 
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on a supplemental verdict for personal property that 
7-11 had located at the subject premises. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E E V I D E N C E S U B M I T T E D BY 
T H E T R I A L COURT A N D T H E IN-
STRUCTIONS G I V E N B Y I T W E R E 
P R O P E R A N D D I D NOT R E S U L T I N 
A N A W A R D TO D E F E N D A N T 
L A N D O W N E R S B R O W N W H I C H E X -
C E E D E D J U S T COMPENSATION. 
Respondents Brown joins with Respondent the 
Southland Corporation in urging the argument set 
forth in Point Number I of its brief and adopt the pro-
visions of the said Point as it is applicable to this Re-
spondent. 
In further support of its Point I these Respondents 
submit that it was the state who selected and determined 
the parties to be joined in this action. Further, it should 
be noted that no motions were made by the state for 
separate trials with respect to the landowner and the 
lessee. 
In Point I of its brief on appeal, the Road Com-
mission urges this Court to adopt the positions that it 
was error to admit evidence of the value of various 
estates or ownership interests in the condemned prop-
erty in assessing the amount of compensation to be 
I Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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awarded in the present condemnation proceeding. The 
above argument and request can only be made in dis-
regard of the provisions of Section 78-34-10(1) of the 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), which deals with "Com-
pensation and Damages—How Determined" in con-
demnation proceedings. The statute provides in perti-
nent part as follows: 
"The court, jury or referee must hear such 
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceeding, and thereupon must 
ascertain and assess: 
(1) The value of the property sought to be 
condemned and all improvements thereon ap-
pertaining to the realty, and of each and every 
separate estate or interest therein. . . ." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The above instruction from the legislature requires 
that each and every separate estate or interest should be 
valued in arriving at a figure that would represent just 
compensation to the condemnees. Obviously, if the jury 
is to perform its statutory duty, it must hear evidence 
of both the existence and the value of separate estates 
or interests in the condemned property. Yet the Road 
Commission ignores this clear statutory mandate in 
favor of the laws of Colorado and New York, which 
provide that ". . . a property is appraised as if it were 
not subject to various ownership interests. . . ." (Ap-
pellant's brief at page 6.) 
In the two Colorado cases cited by the Road Com-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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mission in Point I of its brief, City of Sterling v. Plains 
Investment Co., 511 P . 2d 512 (Colo. 1973), and Vivian 
v. Board of Trustees of Colo. School of Mines, 383 P . 2d 
801 (Colo. 1963), the Colorado Supreme Court held 
that the market value of condemned property is to be 
ascertained in one proceeding and then the award is to 
be apportioned between lessor and lessee in a subsequent 
and separate action. In both cases, the Colorado Su-
preme Court bases its decision upon the provisions of 
Section 50-1-6(3) of the Colorado Revised Statutes 
(Perm. Supp. 1967), which requires in pertinent part 
as follows: 
". . . if there is more than one person interested 
as owner or otherwise in the property and they 
are unable to agree upon the nature, extent, or 
value of their respective interests in the total 
amount of compensation so ascertained and as-
sessed on an undivided basis by either a com-
mission or jury, then the nature, extent, or 
value of said interests shall thereupon be de-
termined according to law in a separate and 
subsequent proceeding and distribution made 
among several claimants thereto." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Road Commission further relies upon the de-
cision of the New York Court of Appeals in Great At-
lantic and Pacific Tea Company v. State, 238 N.E. 2d 
705 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1968) to support its argument in 
favor of a procedure in which separate ownership in-
terests are to be ignored in determining just compen-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sation. As in Colorado, however, the New York Court 
was bound by statutory provision to first find the mar-
ket value of the condemned land, have the sum paid 
into the court, and then apportion the award among the 
various interests in a separate proceeding. Consolidated 
Laws of New York, Volume 9A Condemnation Law § 
22 (1950). 
The Road Commission further argues that: 
"[T]he most glaring error complained of in 
this appeal is that Mr. Saxton [expert witness 
of the Respondents Brown] was obviously al-
lowed to tack on the value of the leasehold over 
and above his own opinion of fair market value 
of the subject property." Appellant's brief at 
page 4. 
Contrary to the above representation of the Road 
Commission, there was no attempt by Mr. Saxton, or 
any other witness, to tack on the value of the leasehold 
over and above the fair market value of the property. 
I t is true that Mr. Saxton opinioned that the exist-
ence of the lease to 7-11 made the property more val-
uable and he did figure in that increment of value in 
determining the value of the whole. Under question-
ing Mr. Saxton testified that over the eleven-year life 
of the lease, the Respondents Brown would have re-
ceived fifty-three thousand six hundred dollars ($53,-
600) (T. 72-73). Mr. Saxton further testified that 
with expenses deducted and then discounted to reflect 
its present value, the lease was worth $33,687.25 at the 
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time of the termination of the lease (Tr. 73). All risks 
attendant to the production of this income had already 
been taken and overcome by the Respondents Brown. 
Through the condemnation, however, the Road Com-
mission extinguished all benefits that the Respondents 
Brown expected to receive under the contract; and 
by this appeal, the Road Commission seeks to keep the 
Browns from receiving any compensation for that loss. 
I t is well established that an owner-lessor may re-
ceive the benefit of his lease in a condemnation action. 
". . . [T]he lessor gets the present value of the 
rents plus the value of the remainder of the 
estate . . ." 29A C.J.S. "Eminent Domain" § 
198. See also City of Ogden v. Stephens, 21 U. 
2d 336, 445 P . 2d 703 (1968). 
Nichols is in agreement that the award to an owner-
lessor must include the present value of the rents re-
served under a lease: 
"Where premises subject to a lease are con-
demned the owner-lessor is generally entitled to 
compensation for three elements; first, the 
stream of income, or rents reserved under the 
lease until the end of the term; second, any 
benefits reserved to him under the lease; 
third, any reversion of the property when the 
term of the lease has run." (Emphasis added.) 
7 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Revised Third 
Edition (1973), § 11-02, p. 11-5. 
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Clearly, the effect that a lease has on market value 
will be considered by both a willing buyer and a willing 
seller. The following expert opinion by Mr. Saxton re-
mained uncontradicted at the trial: 
". . . [T]he increment of value attributable to 
that constant income over a period of many 
years adds value to the land. In fact, the land 
producing this kind of income becomes more 
valuable, and we find that in the marketplace 
many people, many prudent investors, would 
pay much more for the property with the lease 
on it than they would for the property with 
just the building and the land because of this 
increment of value which is attributable to the 
income over a long period of time." (T. 66) 
Even in the cases cited by the Road Commission to 
bolster its argument that the interests of lessor and 
lessee should be tried separately in accordance with the 
laws of Colorado and New York, the courts commented 
that the value of the rents or leases was relevant in de-
termining the fair market value of the property in the 
first proceeding. In addition, Mr. William L. Christen-
sen, fee appraiser for the Road Commission, agreed that 
a lease is relevant in determining fair market value. 
(T. 262) 
I t is clear that there was no error in admitting evi-
dence of the value of the lease to the owner-lessor as an 
element of the fair market value of the leased fee estate. 
I t is also clear that the court submitted the case under 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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proper instruction: Instruction 10 "You are instructed 
that just compensation includes all elements of value 
that inhere in the property, but does not exceed mar-
ket value" . . . (R. 11). 
In its overzealous attempt to urge error the Road 
Commission quotes part of counsel's closing argument 
as evidence that the verdict was all a big misunderstand-
ing. If the Road Commission felt any part of the argu-
ment was improper a timely objection should have been 
made. I t is submitted, however, that taken in context and 
in total and with the court's instructions the jury was in 
no way misled by counsel for the Browns. 
A further argument of the Road Commission in 
Point I of its brief attacks not only the admissibility of 
evidence of the value of a lease as it affects the value 
of the fee estate, but also attacks the weight of that 
evidence. The Road Commission argues generally and 
theoretically that when contract rent under a lease is 
below market rent the lease ceases to be a benefit and 
becomes a liability of the owner-lessor. Analysis of this 
argument reveals it to be as poorly founded as the Road 
Commission's lack of authority suggests. 
While it is evident that of two similar properties the 
one commanding a higher rental will have a higher fair 
market value in most cases, it does not follow that the 
fair market value of the property commanding the 
lower rent is diminished thereby in any way. The stabil-
ity of the lease in question, coupled with the fact that 
all risks attendant thereto had been taken and overcome 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
and the fact that there is a limited supply of quality 
lessees such as 7-11, all clearly support the testimony on 
behalf of the lessor that the lease definitely had value and 
the value of the fee was thereby enhanced. 
Just because Southland Corporation had to pay 
more to get another owner-lessor to construct a new 
very specialized building in another location, it does not 
follow that the lease in question was not a benefit to the 
Respondents Brown, who had a building which, as a 
practical matter, could be used for only one purpose, 
i.e., a 7-11 Store. The findings of the jury are not con-
trary to any of the above testimony. In short, it was not 
established that the lease of the Respondents Brown was 
anything other than a valuable property right, and it 
must be so regarded. 
The Road Commission argues that somehow the 
7-11 store on the subject property was more valuable 
without a lease with Southland Corporation, while in 
fact such a building without a lease is a liability. The 
Road Commission ignores the fact that the figures pre-
sented by Mr. Saxton represented the present value 
of the lease, and that a willing purchaser, after buying 
the property subject to the lease, would receive, over 
eleven years, the difference between the present value 
of the lease ($33,600.00) and the eleven-year value 
of the lease (53,600.00), a difference of approximately 
$20,000.00. The Road Commission also ignores the 
length of the lease, its stability, the identity of the 
lessee (a corporation which has an impeccable credit 
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rating), and the fact that Mr. Brown had already 
absorbed all of the risks inherent in entering into the 
lease, and had only to reap the benefits (T. 54). Ignored 
also is the specialty type of business for which the build-
ing was built. The Road Commission's argument also 
ignores the testimony of one of the owner-lessors (Mr. 
Brown) that he had been unable to lease the building 
since the termination of the lease, except for only two 
and one-half months and then only for $100.00 per 
month, one-fourth the amount per month that the prop-
erty had received under the lease (T. 149, 58). I t is 
readily apparent that the Road Commission conveyed 
no benefit upon the Browns by causing the loss of the 
7-11 lease. 
In conclusion of this point, it is clear that evidence 
of the existence and the value of a lease is admissible 
in order to prove the value of both the leasehold estate 
and the leased fee estate. There is no doubt that consti-
tutional, statutory, and case law demand examination 
of all estates and interests in order to determine the 
amount of just compensation. To deny such an exam-
ination would, under the facts of the present case, work 
a harsh injustice to the Respondents Brown and would 
defy the concept of just compensation. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E R E W A S NO E R R O R I N D E N Y -
I N G T H E ROAI) C O M M I S S I O N S MO-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
TION TO S T R I K E T H E T E S T I M O N Y 
OF T H E D E F E N D A N T S ' E X P E R T 
W I T N E S S . 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence leaves the 
admission of expert testimony to the sound discretion 
of the trial judge, "which discretion should not be dis-
turbed lightly or not at all, unless it clearly appears he 
was in error". Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 9 
U. 2d 275, 342 P . 2d 1094 (1959) at 1097. 
The Road Commission critizes Mr. Saxton's opin-
ion that the raw land, absent improvements, should be 
valued at $1.25 per square foot, arguing that this opin-
ion was based in part on previous sales made to the Road 
Commission for the same project in the same locality. 
While the forced nature of such sales may or may not 
have affected their reliability for use in determining the 
fair market value, any error committed in reliance upon 
such figures is harmless in view of the fact that Mr. Ray 
Williams, expert witness for the Road Commission, 
opined the same figure as being the value of unimproved 
ground in that area (T. 324). 
The Road Commission also complains about the 
date used by Saxton in evaluating the lease. Although 
Mr. Saxton's valuation of the lease was related to the 
date of termination in August, 1973, rather than to the 
date of the taking December 22, 1971, Mr. Saxton ex-
plained that to do otherwise would not have been a true 
valuation (T. 72). The statutory valuation date was in 
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1971. The tenant Southland Corporation, however, had 
remained in the building until August of 1973, at which 
time the lease was terminated as a result of the taking. 
To have valued the lease from December of 1971 would 
have added over $6000 to the value of the lease. In view 
of the fact that the owner-lessors had received rentals 
until the date of termination, it would not be right to 
try to recover for damages not actually suffered. Since 
any error in this regard could only work to the benefit 
of the Road Commission, it is apparent that there was 
no abuse of the discretion of the trial court in denying 
the Road Commission's motion to strike on this ground. 
Further complaint is made that Mr. Saxton based 
his opinion of the value of the property in part on his 
assumption that the entire property was subject to the 
lease. The Road Commission points out in its brief, 
however, that in fact only a portion of the property was 
so encumbered. However, any mistake on this point can 
only work in favor of the Road Commission. All of the 
property actually taken by the Road Commission was 
subject to the lease. The value of each square foot 
actually taken was therefore higher than the value as-
signed by Mr. Saxton because the increment of value 
represented by the lease would be applicable to fewer 
square feet. Hence, if the view of the Road Commission 
is taken, a higher value per square foot taken should be 
assigned, resulting in a higher award to the condemnees. 
Again, if there is an error at all, the outcome of that 
error is favorable to the Road Commission. 
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The Road Commission criticizes Mr. Saxton's con-
sideration of the value of the lease as one of the elements 
of the fair market value of the condemned property, and 
claims that his testimony should be stricken on this 
ground. As is illustrated in Point I, supra, Mr. Saxton's 
consideration of the value of the lease merely evidences 
his expertise in the field of real estate appraisal and 
his understanding of Utah law. 
In conclusion of this point, it is readily seen that 
the Road Commission seeks to strike the testimony of 
Mr. Saxton not on the basis of claimed prejudicial 
mistakes, but because Mr. Saxton's testimony was ad-
verse to the Road Commission's position that a lease 
should be totally ignored in condemnation proceedings. 
The error of the position taken by the Road Commis-
sion is illustrated in Point I, supra. Any other mistake 
claimed by the Road Commission to have been made by 
Mr. Saxton was actually a benefit to the Road Com-
mission, and was not prejudicial in any way. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E J U R Y ' S V E R D I C T W A S NOT 
I N C O N S I S T E N T W I T H T H E EVI -
D E N C E P R E S E N T E D A T T R I A L . 
The jury awarded a total verdict to Respondents 
W. Roy Brown and Evelyn J. Brown and to Respon-
dent Southland Corporation of $78,607.76, which was 
broken down as follows: 
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Fair market value of property 
taken $ 25,229.76 
Severance damage 53,378.00 
T O T A L $ 78,607.76 
Apportionment between lessors 
and lessee: 
W. Roy Brown and Evelyn J . 
Brown (Leased fee estate) $ 62,840.76 
Southland Corporation 
(Leasehold) 15,767.00 
T O T A L $ 78,607.76 
In Point I I I of its brief, the Road Commission 
aigues for reversal on the ground that the amount of 
severance damage awarded by the jury, $53,378.00, 
was not sustained by the evidence presented. The Road 
Commission's criticism of the jury's verdict is inaccu-
rate and leads to the above erroneous conclusion. A re-
view of the evidence shows clearly that the Road Com-
mission's argument is based more on semantics than on 
legal reasoning. 
Mr. Saxton's testimony shows that in his opinion 
the Respondents Brown alone were entitled to damages 
in the sum of $110,900.00 (Tr. 61), which would sustain 
a verdict well in excess of the $78,607.76 that the jury 
returned for both Southland and the Browns to share 
between them. Careful scrutiny of Mr. Saxton's testi-
mony indicates he was breaking down severance damages 
into two categories and that his testimony regarding 
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such damages would support a verdict substantially 
larger than that returned by the jury. Mr. Saxton in-
itially included in his figure for the value of the land 
taken ($65,833.74) the amount attributable to the loss 
of the lease. Later during cross examination by the 
Road Commission, at the urging of its counsel, he indi-
cated that it could be included in severance (Tr. 104-105, 
129). In addition, Mr. William L. Christensen, witness 
for the Road Commission, characterized the loss of in-
come as an item of severance damage (Tr. 259). 
In any event, the owner of the property, Mr. 
Brown, testified to a severance figure substantially in 
excess of the jury's verdict (Tr. 154). The Utah 
Supreme Court has accepted the testimony of owners 
of land in determining values and damages for condem-
nation proceedings. State through Road Commission 
v. Dillree, 25 U.2d 184, P.2d 507 (1970). In DUlree, 
supra, the issue on appeal was whether the jury could 
return a damage award based on the estimate of the 
property owner, which was higher than the estimate of 
the expert witness. The court held it could. 
In the instant case, Mr. Roy Brown, the owner 
of the property, testified that in his opinion the fair 
market value of the Browns' estate before the taking 
was $160,000.00 (Tr. 154). When asked about the 
value of this interest after the taking and the consequen-
tial loss of the lease, Mr. Brown testified: 
"Well, without the lease and without the 
frontage, and without the parking and the 
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entrance in the front—there's no entrance in 
the side of that building at all—in my opinion 
it's worth $40,000.00. (Tr. 154). 
Mr. Brown's opinion of the total damage suffered by 
the Respondents Brown, therefore, was $120,000, which 
included both severance and the value of the property 
taken. This clearly supports a verdict substantially 
higher than that returned by the jury. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Road 
Commission's objection to the jury's verdict is raised 
for the first time in its brief on appeal. Counsel for the 
Road Commission allowed the verdict to be entered 
without objection and there was no motion for remittur 
or for new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there is no merit to the claims made 
by the Road Commission in its brief on appeal. Although 
the Road Commission objected to the admission of evi-
dence of the existence of the lease and of the value of 
the lease to both the lessor and the lessee, such an objec-
tion cannot stand in light of the requirement of Utah 
law that the jury ascertain and assess in a single pro-
ceeding each and every separate estate or interest in 
condemned property. I t is settled that the value of a 
lease is a relevant factor in determining the fair market 
value of property under condemnation. I t is further 
submitted that the two-hearing approach advocated by 
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the Road Commission is not supported by Utah law. Nor 
was there a timely request made to so separate the trials. 
The evidence taken as a whole clearly supports the 
verdicts and they were clearly not excessive. The jury 
verdict should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. E U G E N E H A N S E N 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents Brown 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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